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Abstract
This paper explores the link between voters information, corruption
and e¢ ciency in the context of a career concern model where politically
connected local monopolies are in charge of the provision of a local public
service. We nd that both a corrupt environment and a low level of voters
information on managerial actions induce managers to reduce e¤ort levels,
thereby contributing to drive down e¢ ciency. We test our predictions
using data on solid waste management services provided by a large sample
of Italian municipalities. We estimate a stochastic cost frontier model that
provides robust evidence that services provided in more corrupt regions
and in regions with low voters information are substantially less cost
e¢ cient. We show that the negative impact of a corrupt environment
is weaker for municipalities ruled by left-wing parties, while the positive
impact of voters information is larger if the waste collection service is
managed by limited liability companies.
We nally quantify potential cost savings associated to operating in a
less corrupt environment and in one in which voters are more informed
through a simulation on six major Italian cities. The magnitude of the
gures suggests that e¤ective anti-corruption measures, and/or carefully
designed incentives for citizens to acquire information, can generate sig-
nicant economic benets.
Keywords : corruption, votersinformation, e¢ ciency, solid waste
JEL Classication : D24, D72, D73, L25, Q53.
1 Introduction
In Western countries, many local public services, including water provision, gas
distribution and waste collection and disposal, are managed as local monopolies.
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They are typically operated by rms with tight political connections, if not
directly by the local government (in-house provision), usually under soft budget
constraints.
Local public utilities sharing the above characteristics may be particularly
ine¢ cient, due to the interplay of two factors, managerial slack and corruption.
Firms with market power are particularly exposed to managerial slack, espe-
cially in the absence of e¤ective monitoring devices or appropriate incentive
schemes (Nickell, 1996). Markets with an extensive degree of interaction be-
tween politicians and rms tend to be associated to higher levels of corruption
and patronage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). This is empirically documented by
Menozzi et al. (2012), in their analysis of the e¤ects of political connections on
utilitiesperformances.1
This paper analyzes a framework in which politically connected local mo-
nopolies organize the provision of a local public service. It recognizes that the
degree of e¢ ciency in managing the service crucially depends on managersac-
countability, as well as on the level of corruption of the environment they operate
in.
In this non-competitive environment, in addition to the legal threats asso-
ciated to managerial misbehavior, it is votersreaction that provides managers
with the incentives to refrain from company-damaging activities (such as slack-
ing or engaging in corrupt behavior). Informed voters, when they perceive the
company is mismanaged, may hold the politician associated to that manager
accountable, and base their re-election decision on that consideration.
We rst model the relation between productivity, votersinformation, and
the presence of a corrupt environment, using a standard career concern approach
to political agency. The fact that more voters information is associated to
a higher productivity of the public service is well known (similar results are
obtained, among others, by Besley and Burgess, 2002; Ponzetto, 2011; Drago et
al., 2014; Nannicini et al., 2013).2 It results from the interplay of two factors:
each manager puts in more e¤ort, and, on average, more talented managers are
selected. We enrich this standard setting, by explicitly introducing corruption
into it. Following Treisman (2000), we regard corruption as the abuse of public
o¢ ce for private gain. Using Dal Bò and Rossis (2007) approach, we then
characterize a corrupt environment as one where private benets from diverting
managerial e¤ort away from the productive process are substantial3 . We do
1Menozzi et al. (2012) analyze a sample of Italian local public utilities active in gas, water
and electricity distribution. They show that politically connected directors exert a positive
and signicant e¤ect on employment, while they impact negatively on accounting measures
of performance.
2For example, Drago et al. (2014) show that an improvement of observability due to the
increase in the number of di¤erent newspapers available at the local level has the e¤ect of
keeping the activity of local governments more accountable. In a similar vein, Nannicini et al.
(2013) show that in electoral districts endowed with high levels of social capital (measured by
indices of blood donations, electoral participation and by the presence of non-prot organiza-
tions) politicians are more accountable and therefore are induced to exert higher e¤ort levels
and to reduce misbehaviour.
3This denition encompasses both corruption strictu sensu (for example, bribes that politi-
cians and managers obtain from providers in exchange for outsourcing contracts) as well as
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not model corruption as an activity that directly damages the rm, nor do we
delve into the corruptive mechanisms within the rm; instead, we emphasize the
notion that managers respond to incentives to corruption, which are determined
by the institutional environment in which they operate. We show that, holding
votersinformation constant, a corrupt environment distorts managerial e¤ort
incentives, leading to an increase in the extent of ine¢ ciency. We then derive the
implication that ine¢ ciency is greater for local public service providers located
in more corrupt regions, besides being greater in regions where voters are less
informed on managersactions.
We test these predictions using a rich unique micro dataset on the solid waste
collection and disposal activity in Italy, which includes more than ve hundred
municipalities observed in the years 2004-2006. We use a stochastic cost frontier
approach to analyze the e¤ects of accountability and of a corrupt environment
on the costs of providing municipal solid waste (MSW) services. We proxy
votersinformation by newspapersreadership, while we measure the extent of
corruption of the environment by the number of criminal charges against the
State, public governments and social institutions. The empirical evidence sup-
ports our predictions. We nd that both voters information and corruption
have a separate impact, in the expected direction, on the costs of MSW ser-
vices. Moreover, by enriching our cost frontier specication, we obtain some
interesting additional insights. In particular, we nd that the impact of voters
information on reducing ine¢ ciency is smaller or even disappears when munici-
palities organize the service in-house or join a intermunicipal consortium, while
operating in a corrupt area is less detrimental to e¢ ciency when municipalities
are ruled by left-wing parties.
The relationship between votersinformation and the performance of local
public governments has rarely been investigated empirically. An exception is
Giordano and Tommasino (2013), who identify the determinants of public sector
e¢ ciency of the Italian local governments. They show that measures of citizens
political engagement (electoral turnout for referenda and number of newspapers
sold) have a positive and signicant impact on the e¢ ciency of the provision
of local public services such as education, civil justice, healthcare and waste
disposal, while measures of social capital do not have any discernible e¤ect.
They do not consider the impact of a corrupt environment.
The negative incidence of corruption on e¢ ciency is well documented. Most
of the empirical literature relies on cross-country comparisons and makes use
of country level measures of corruption such as the Transparency International
index or the Corruption Perception index, while very few papers use disaggre-
gated data at the rm or at the local government level.4 For instance, Dal Bò
and Rossi (2007) estimate a labour requirement function on a set of 80 elec-
tricity distribution rms active in 13 Latin America countries, and show that
rms operating in more corrupt environments tend to be less e¢ cient in terms of
other forms of political patronage (e.g., the choice to employ workers in excess of the business
needs, in order to build and maintain political support).
4See Svensson (2005) and Banerjee et al. (2013) for comprehensive reviews of the literature
dealing with corruption.
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labour use. Yan and Oum (2014) provide a single country-rm level study. They
investigate the e¤ect of a corrupt environment on the cost e¢ ciency of a sample
of 55 US commercial airports observed from 2001 to 2009, and nd a detrimen-
tal e¤ect of corruption on e¢ ciency. Moreover, airports tended to contract out
more activities to replace in-house labour under more corrupt environments.
Our paper is the rst to analyze, theoretically and empirically, whether both
channels (a corrupt environment and votersinformation) matter separately in
determining the e¢ ciency level of politically connected businesses.
Waste collection is a particularly suitable sector for our analysis. In Italy,
waste collection and disposal are mainly carried out under the tight control of
local governments. Although citizens have an interest in the e¢ cient manage-
ment of the MSW activity, due to the impact on the tax burden, it is reasonable
to assume that they do not have complete information about technology and
are unable to perfectly assess its performance. Also, a corrupt environment
may certainly have an impact on the sector, for instance by a¤ecting manage-
rial propensity to negotiate with local governments in order to establish more
favorable tari¤s and service obligations, thereby diverting the managerial e¤orts
away from cost monitoring and productive tasks.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
the theoretical analysis. Section 3 describes the main features of the dataset,
presents the econometric model and shows the main results of the estimates.
Section 4 contains our concluding remarks.
2 The model
We model a MSW service operated by a company tightly linked to politics.
We capture this notion by assuming that the manager of the rm is selected
by the political party in power. In our environment, politicians, after selecting
the manager, are unable to motivate him through incentive-based remuneration
schemes. In addition, managerscareers are tied to politicians in power, in the
sense that managers are reappointed whenever the politician in power is re-
elected, and replaced whenever the incumbent politician is ousted; politicians
are prevented from ring a manager they have appointed.6 This is reective
of the Italian organization of the MSW sector. Waste services are typically
operated by municipally-owned companies which adopt a spoils system, whereby
managers are replaced when the political majority changes; ring a manager is
administratively complicated and costly, not only because it may be regarded
as an admission of failure, but also because it usually requires a reshu­ ing
of the board of directors, which may present signicant political di¢ culties.
5Also, as discussed in DAmato et al. (2015), organized crime has developed a strategy
to enter the waste cycle, mainly aimed at creating shadow circuits for illegal transport and
disposal. In this context, the di¤usion of collusive relationships among managers and suppliers
aimed at overcharging the rms and at seeking illegal sources of prots is an undisputed matter
of fact.
6Vlaicu and Whalley (2016) solve a model in which politicians are entitled to re the
managers after each period.
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Furthermore, managers of municipally-owned companies are entitled to a xed
wage (R in our model), and were typically not entitled, in the 2004-2006 period,
to receive performance-based remunerations.
Each manager operates in an environment characterized by a certain degree
of corruption. In corrupt environments, as in Dal Bò and Rossi (2007), managers
are privately rewarded for engaging in a range of activities that provide no value
to the rm. For instance, they may inappropriately use their position to provide
political support to the incumbent politician they are linked to, or they may
spend time building social relationships with people or groups outside the rm.
2.1 Setting
We analyze a political/managerial agency model with elections, in which agents
are innitely lived and discount the future at a rate  2 [0; 1] : There is a
continuum of self-interested risk neutral voters. Their utility is inversely related
to the costs of the MSW operator, which is covered by a subsidy assumed to
be funded through taxation. For simplicity, while multiple policy issues enter
voters consideration, we restrict attention to the single issue of managerial
performances, to illustrate how managerial e¤ort is shaped by electoral concerns.
The task of the manager consists in mininizing the cost borne by the rm.
The manager may provide value to the company, by reducing its cost. We
denote as t the value that the manager provides to the company in time t.
In particular,  measures by how much the manager is able to reduce the cost
with respect to a benchmark. A negative  indicates that the cost is above the
threshold. In what follows, with a slight abuse of denition, we will designate 
as managerial productivity.
t depends both on managerial talent t and on how much e¤ort he puts
into managing the company (which we designate as productive e¤ort), denoted
ap, according to the following relation:
t = t + a
p
t
Besides exerting e¤ort in the productivity-enhancing activity ap, the man-
ager also can exert e¤ort in an activity that, while potentially generating a
private benet for the manager, has no direct impact, either positive or nega-
tive, on the rms performance. This e¤ort, which we designate as unproductive,
is denoted au. E¤ort in the unproductive activity generates a marginal return
 to the manager.  thus measures how rewarding distorting e¤ort away from
the productive activity is; when  = 0, e¤ort distortion is not rewarding at all.
Hence, following Dal Bò and Rossi (2007), we regard  as a measure of the level
of corruption in the institutional environment in which the rm operates.
Observe that the models main insights would remain unaltered if we as-
sumed that e¤ort in the unproductive activity negatively a¤ects ; this as-
sumption would capture all managerial actions against the rm in exchange for
briberies. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, benets from investing in the
5
unproductive activity are assumed to be a function of the e¤ort in the unpro-
ductive activity only (and not of the managerial talent).
Managers keep devoting e¤ort to the unproductive activity, and beneting
from it, even once they are ousted from the rm. This reects the notion that,
in a corrupt environment, managerial positions in politically-related companies
allow to develop long-term links and networks which can be exploited even after
the manager loses his job. In such cases, ap = 0, R = 0 but au  0.
We assume that a more competent politician selects a more talented man-
ager, on a one-to-one relation. A manager is appointed by the politician when
he enters o¢ ce for the rst time, and holds his post until the politician is
ousted from power. As illustrated above, this reects the incentives involved by
the Italian institutional setting in the MSW collection sector in the 2004-2006
period.
Politicians, in this model, only play the role of selecting managers. The
managerial talent t evolves over time according to the following relation:
t = t 1 + t
where t 1 and t (which we will refer to as period-specic skills) are i.i.d.
random shocks and   N  ; 2. In this formulation (used, for instance, by
Alesina and Tabellini, 2008), managerial ability changes gradually over time,
capturing the notion that rms operate in a dynamic environment, which re-
quires continuously evolving skills for the manager. It follows that we can
rewrite:
t = t 1 + t + a
p
t (1)
Managers are career-concerned, and have a xed per period reward R, which
does not depend on e¤ort.
The time-line is as follows. At the beginning of each period t, the t 1 specic
skill t 1 for the incumbent manager becomes common knowledge. However,
before exerting e¤orts apt and a
u
t , the manager does not fully know his talent. In
particular, he is unaware of the period t specic skill t. There is no asymmetric
information in this model; in period t, both the manager and voters know t 1,
but neither the manager nor voters know t. At stage two, all voters observe
the same noisy signal of managerial productivity:
bt = t + apt + t (2)
where t is an i.i.d. shock N
 
0; 2

; uncorrelated to talent (E[tt] = 0).
All voters observe the same signal bt. The variance of the noise 2 reects
the extent of imprecision in the observability of managerial behavior. High 2
thus indicates less voters information on managerial behavior. Voters use bt
to make their own inference on the level of the time-specic skill bt. In period
t+ 1, the managerial competence is t + t+1. Thus, votersexpectation on the
level of managerial competence at time t + 1; in case the incumbent manager
is reappointed, is bt + , where the unconditional expectation  is the best
predictor of t+1. If, instead, a new manager is appointed at t+ 1, both t and
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t+1 are randomly drawn; in this case, the best predictor at time t of a new
managers competence at t+ 1 is 2. At stage three, elections are held, pitting
the incumbent politician to a randomly drawn challenger. Voters recognize that
the fate of the manager is tied to that of the politician. They thus re-elect the
incumbent politician if the manager he is associated to is, in expectation, more
skilled than the manager linked to the challenger, which occurs if bt > .
In our environment, elections are used to remove badly performing managers.
While votersbehavior is geared to the selection of competent managers, rather
than to e¤ort elicitation, the incumbent manager is motivated to exert e¤ort in
the attempt to boost the perception of his competence in the eyes of the voters.
Managerial incentives turn out to be identical to those of the politician in a
standard political agency game in which the politician is career concerned (see,
for instance, Bonglioli and Gancia, 2013).
2.1.1 The voters
The model is solved backwards. Citizens are confronted with an inference prob-
lem. While, at the end of period t, they wish to conrm the politician (and,
as a consequence, the manager) only if the manager displays a su¢ ciently high
level of competence, they may just observe the noisy managerial productivity
signal bt.
Citizens form a posterior belief on managerial ability, solving a standard
signal extraction problem:
bt = E tjbt = 22 + 2 + 
2

2 + 
2

bt   t 1   ap;et  (3)
where ap;et is the productive e¤ort level that, under rational expectations, citi-
zens anticipate that will be prevailing in equilibrium.
Observe that, as in any signal extraction problem, citizens weigh the prior 
and the signal
bt   t 1   ap;et  by the variances. The more precise the signal,
the higher the weight the citizens attach to it.
Citizens would like the politician (and the manager he is attached to) to be
conrmed if their best predictor of the managers time-specic ability exceeds
the average, i.e. if bt > . This implies that the incumbent political party is con-
rmed in o¢ ce (and, as a consequence, the incumbent manager is reappointed)
if: bt   t 1   ap;et >  (4)
Condition (4) shows that citizens adopt a threshold rule. They determine,
through the re-election of the incumbent politician, the reappointment of the
incumbent manager, as long as the observed managerial productivity bt exceeds
the expected managerial productivity generated by a manager of average skills
.
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2.1.2 The manager
The managers cost is a convex function of the sum of the e¤orts put in the two
tasks:
C (at) =
(aut + a
p
t )
2
2
The manager trades o¤ costly productive e¤ort both with the probability of
retaining his post, and with privately rewarding unproductive e¤ort. The man-
ager chooses e¤ort levels aut and a
p
t , having the same information set as voters,
that is, knowing t 1, but not knowing t. The managerial objective at time t
consists in maximizing Vt, the managers discounted value from occupying the
managerial position at time t:
max
apt ;a
u
t
Vt = R+ a
u
t  
(apt + a
u
t )
2
2
+ (5)
+
 
Pr (bt > japt )Vt+1 + (1  Pr (bt > japt )) eaut   (eaut )221  
!
where eaut is the unproductive e¤ort chosen by the manager after he loses
his job, when he devotes his entire energy to the unproductive activity.7 The
optimal amount of e¤ort under such circumstances is clearly eaut =  , which
results from optimally trading o¤, at each period t, its total benets eaut with
its total cost (eaut )22 . It follows that the uniperiodal outside option prot is 22 .
The objective function (5) may thus be rewritten as:
max
apt ;a
u
t
Vt = R+ a
u
t  
(apt + a
u
t )
2
2
+ (6)
+

Pr (bt > japt )Vt+1 + (1  Pr (bt > japt )) 22 (1  )

Given the recursive nature of the problem, Vt = Vt+1, and the optimal choice
of e¤ort is determined as:
apt ; a
u
t = arg max
apt ;a
u
t
V = arg max
apt ;a
u
t
8<:R+ a
u
t   (a
p
t+a
u
t )
2
2 +  (1  (1 G (apt ))) 
2
2(1 )
1   (1 G (apt ))
9=;
(7)
where G, the probability of not being reappointed, is jointly normally dis-
tributed N
 
; 2 + 
2


, given the independence assumption of  and , and g
is its density.
7Clearly, e¤ort put in the unproductive activity when the manager is no longer in chargebaut di¤ers from the unproductive e¤ort when the manager runs the company, aut .
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2.1.3 Equilibrium e¤ort and selection
The optimal choices of aut and a
p
t are determined by di¤erentiating (7):
@V
@aut
=    (apt + aut ) = 0
@V
@apt
=

  (apt + aut )  
2
2 (1  )g (+ a
e;p
t   apt )

(1  (1 G)) + (8)
+g (+ ae;pt   apt )
 
R+ aut  
(apt + a
u
t )
2
2
+ G
2
2 (1  )
!
= 0
In equilibrium, voters correctly predict the e¤ort level. As a result, apt = a
e;p
t
and G = 12 . By adopting a conveniently parsimonious notation, we denotee   2 + 2 and A = e (2  )2. It follows that, after rearranging (8), we
obtain:
aut =
8<:
0 if  < 
   R +
p
2A
2 if 
 <  < 
 if  > 
(9)
apt =
8>><>>:
p
2
2
q
2 (4R  22) +A pA

if  < 
R
  
p
2A
2 if 
 <  < 
0 if  > 
(10)
where  (A; ;R) =
p
2
4
p
8R2 +A pA

, and  (A; ;R) = 2Rp
2A
:
Figure 1 illustrates a simulation of the results. The 45 degree line representsbaut =  , that is, the unproductive e¤ort put in by the manager after he leaves the
job. The other two curves show the equilibrium levels of apt and a
u
t . Managerial
incentives to undertake the unproductive activity when in o¢ ce are directly
a¤ected by the level of corruption in the environment; a higher return on the
unproductive activity  is associated to a higher unproductive e¤ort aut . This
reduces the managerial e¤ort in the productive activity apt through two channels.
First, as a result of convexity of the cost function in the sum of the two e¤orts,
the marginal cost of productive e¤ort is increasing in the amount of unproductive
e¤ort. Second, the value of productive e¤ort is inversely a¤ected by the outside
option for the manager after he loses his job, which, in turn, is proportional to
the return on the unproductive e¤ort. As a result, the equilibrium value of apt ,
as a function of the level of corruption, exhibits a pattern of negative correlation.
When  is null, the manager has no incentives to engage in the unproductive
activity aut , and the result fully reproduces the model without corruption. When
 is positive but small (0 <  < ), returns on the productive activity, while
the manager is active, still overwhelm returns on the unproductive activity,
so that unproductive e¤ort while the manager is active remains null (while
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unproductive e¤ort is, for such values of  , positive after the manager is ousted
from o¢ ce). However, productive e¤ort declines with  , as a result of the higher
attractiveness of the outside option.
As  gets larger ( <  < ), the manager distributes his e¤ort across
the two activities. In this interval, marginal increments in  , while increasing
unproductive e¤ort aut , reduce productive e¤ort a
p
t . This occurs through both
the increase in marginal cost of the productive activity, and the increase in the
appeal of the outside option.
For large values of  ( > ), returns to the unproductive activity prevail,
and the manager allocates his e¤ort to the unproductive activity only, even
when in o¢ ce.
A manager benets from his appointment being renewed when the returns on
aut are not disproportionately higher than those on a
p
t , in particular for  < 
,
where  is a function of e;  and R. In this interval, more patience (larger
), as well as a higher wage R, magnies the re-appointment rewards, leading
to a rise in apt (and, correspondingly, to a decline in a
u
t ); similarly, a surge in
the precision of the prior, or of the citizens inference of the managers skills
(i.e., a decrease in 2 and in 
2
 respectively), raises the managerial productive
e¤ort, as it induces a more accurate alignment between the managers e¤ort
and his re-appointment. In addition, observe that, for  < , aut < eaut =  ,
that is, unproductive e¤ort is always smaller when the manager is active (and,
as a consequence, shares his e¤ort across the two activities), than after he loses
his job (and unproductive e¤ort remains his only option); this stems from cost
convexity in the sum of e¤orts. Conversely, when  > , re-appointment has
no value for the manager; therefore, apt = 0, and a
u
t = eaut =  .
Finally, we consider the expected talent of a politician in the stationary
equilibrium.
E (t) = E(tjbt 1 < ) Pr  bt 1 < + E(tjbt 1 > ) Pr  bt 1 >  =
= 2+
2q
2
 
2 + 
2


Rational expectations on the part of the voters imply that the level of cor-
ruption  does not a¤ect the ability of voters to screen politicians, and, as a
result, does not a¤ect their expected talent.
Expected managerial productivity at time t is therefore:
E (t) = E (t) + a
p
t = (11)
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p
2
2
q
2 (4R  22) +A pA

+ 2+
2q
2(2+2)
if  < 
R
  
p
2A
2 + 2+
2q
2(2+2)
if  <  < 
2+
2q
2(2+2)
if  > 
(12)
The results are summarized in the following:
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Proposition 1 The expected managerial productivity (weakly) decreases when
the environment is more corrupt (i.e., when parameter  increases). Also, it
declines when voters have a less precise information (i.e., high 2), and when
the dispersion in managerial talent is greater (i.e., high 2p):
Proof. It is immediate to see, after di¤erentiating (12) and (10), that
@E (t)
@
=
8><>:
 
p
2p
2(4R 22)+A for  < 

  R2 if  <  < 
0 if  > 
 0
@E (t)
@2
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
p
2A
p
A+2(4R 22) pA

4epA+2(4R 22)   14
p
2p

2
(2+2)
3
2
for  < 
 
p
2(2 )2
4
p
A
  14
p
2p

2
(2+2)
3
2
if  <  < 
  14
p
2p

2
(2+2)
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The result that votersinformation reduces managerial productivity is con-
sonant with results on the positive relation between observability and political
e¢ ciency (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Ponzetto, 2011; Drago et al., 2014; Nan-
nicini et al., 2013). Observe that low voters information and the presence
of a corrupt environment, while being both sources of declines in managerial
productivity, operate through two distinct mechanisms: low voters information
(higher variance 2 of the noise) entails a reduction in the total e¤ort put in
by the manager, while a corrupt environment induces a diversion of the e¤ort
away from the productive activity. Also, votersinformation has an impact on
managerial expected talent, while the level of corruption does not.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The econometric model
We test our theoretical predictions that costs are higher for utilities located in
more corrupt regions, and in regions where voters are less informed, by adopting
a stochastic cost frontier approach to model the expenditure for collection and
disposal of solid waste at the municipal level, and using proxies to analyze the
e¤ects of corruption and voters information on the cost.
The econometric model can be expressed in general terms as:
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lnTCit = c(yit; pit;) + uit + vit (13)
uit  N+((zit; ); 2u)
vit  N(0; 2)
where TCit is the total cost incurred by municipality i at time t, yit is a vector
of outputs, pit is a vector of input prices,  is a vector of parameters to be
estimated, vit is a standard error term measuring random noise and uit is a non-
negative error term, to be interpreted as cost ine¢ ciency. The latter follows a
truncated normal distribution whose pre-truncation mean is parameterized on
a set of exogenous factors zit  such as our key variables of interest, voters
information and corruption and a vector of parameters  to be estimated.
The two sets of parameters ( and ) are estimated simultaneously.8
We adopt a linear specication of the mean value of the ine¢ ciency term,
following Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995):
it = 0 + z
0
it (14)
Given the sign of  parameters, a variation of z variables changes the mean of
the pre-truncated distribution of uit, thus allowing for an increase/decrease of
the estimated cost ine¢ ciency, in line with our theoretical model.9
Cost ine¢ ciency uit is estimated as its conditional expectation buit, given
the tted value of it = uit + vit, i.e. buit = E (uitjit), following Jondrow et
al. (1982).10 buit can then be transformed into a measure of distance from
the optimal frontier. The cost ine¢ ciency measure CIit, following Battese and
Coelli (1988), is then dened as:
CIit = E (e
uit jit) (15)
(15) yields ine¢ ciency values greater than (or equal to) 1, readily interpretable
as percentage deviations from the minimum attainable cost. Given that the ex-
pected ine¢ ciency (i.e. the mean of the pre-truncated distribution) is modeled
as a function of a set of variables z, the e¤ect of such variables on the esti-
mated cost ine¢ ciency index depends on the features of the truncated normal
8This is what Wang and Schmidt (2002) refers to as one-step procedure, as opposed to a
two-step approach which consists of estimating cost ine¢ ciency without including exogenous
factors and subsequently tting a model in which a set of variables is used to explain the
estimated ine¢ ciency. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations provided by Wang and Schmidt
(2002) provided evidence in favor of the one-step approach since the two-step procedure is
a¤ected by serious biases in both the involved steps.
9 In principle, other possibilities would be feasible to analyze the impact of social environ-
ment characteristics on the level of costs. An alternative would be, for instance, the inclusion
of a set of environmental features zit directly in c(yit; pit; zit;), thus allowing for a modi-
cation of its shape. This option is, however, not appropriate given our purposes, since it
assumes that the social characteristics of the operating environment do not impact directly
on the e¤ort of the municipalities or on their negotiation capabilities.
10uit cannot be simply derived as a residual, since the composite error includes the statistical
noise vit term, which is not observable.
12
distribution. In general, their marginal e¤ect on cost e¢ ciency CE (i.e., the
inverse of cost ine¢ ciency, ranging from 0 to 1) may be computed as (Olsen and
Henningsen, 2011):
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where  (:) and  denote the cumulative distribution function and the den-
sity function of the standard normal distribution,  = (1  b) b + bb ,  =pb (1  b) b , b = bu + bv, b = bub , bu is the estimated value of the standard
deviation of the ine¢ ciency term, bv is the estimated value of the standard
deviation of random noise, b is the estimated value of the composed error term
(b = bu+ bv ), b is the estimated expected value of the truncated distribution of
the ine¢ ciency term, based on the  parameters. The marginal e¤ects calcu-
lated at the individual observation level measure the (monotonic) variation in
the cost e¢ ciency index with respect to a contour change of the z variable.
3.2 Data and variables
The database, which can be considered as fairly representative of the entire pop-
ulation of Italian municipalities, refers to a balanced panel of 529 municipalities
(of which 204 are located in the North, 207 in the South, and the remaining 118
in the Center of Italy) observed over the period 2004-2006. Table 1 presents the
summary statistics of the variables included in the cost frontier specication.
For each municipality, we observe:
- the total cost (TC), which is the sum of labor, capital and fuel costs
incurred to provide the MSW service;
- the tons of MSW disposed (yD);
- the tons of MSW sent for recycling (yR);
- the price of labor (pL), given by the ratio of total salary expenses to
the number of full-time equivalent employees;
- the price of diesel fuel (pF );
- the price of capital (pK), obtained by dividing depreciation costs by
the capital stock.
We merged di¤erent sources of data. Data on costs and output quantities
were obtained from annual MUDs (i.e. annual declarations concerning municipal
solid waste collection) and were provided by Ecocerved. As to input prices, we
relied on balance sheets of the rms (or internal organizational structures of
the municipalities, in case of in-house provision) managing the service in the
municipalities. As an exception, the price of diesel fuel was drawn from data
released by the local Chambers of Commerce.
Table 1 shows that the average municipality produces almost 21,000 tons of
waste, around 20 per cent of which is sent to recycling, with an average cost per
ton in the neighborhood of 250 Euros.
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Our database contains information concerning the organizational structure
of the MSW service as well as the political orientation of the municipality. The
limited liability company is by far the most popular legal form (82 percent
of the entire sample), followed by in-house provision (10 percent) and inter-
municipal partnership (8 percent). The political environment is captured by
data on the political majorities ruling the municipalities. Data indicate that
left-wing parties are governing around 29 percent of municipalities, right-wing
parties around 18 percent, and "civic or municipal lists", that is independent
local political groups which are not a¢ liated to major nation-wide left-wing or
right-wing parties, the remaining 53 percent.11
Finally, the cornerstone of the analysis is related to the measurement of
votersinformation (VOTINFO) and of the level of corruption of the environ-
ment. We proxy votersinformation by newspapers di¤usion (as in Snyder and
Stromberg, 2010), measured by the number of newspapers readers for every
1,000 inhabitants (excluding sport newspapers) as in Cartocci (2007).12 This
indicator is available only at the province-level of disaggregation, thus we associ-
ated each municipality to its provincial value.13 This seems a reasonable degree
of approximation given that the average dimension of an Italian province is quite
small (around 2700 km2 and 500,000 inhabitants). Moreover, in our dataset,
there is a total of 101 provinces (out of 110), thus a suitable cross-section vari-
ability is ensured.
A crucial point of the analysis clearly concerns the complex assessment of the
level of corruption of the environment. As argued by Golden and Picci (2005),
directly measuring corruption is an enterprise that is not possible since cor-
ruption is a complex set of variable interactions, processes and phenomena with
no single metric(p. 37). Moreover, as suggested by Olken (2009), the most
commonly used measures are based on corruption perceptions, while more e¤ort
should be put in constructing more objective corruption indices, which could
produce more reliable results: "Perceptions data should be used for empirical
research on the determinants of corruption with considerable caution, and there
is little alternative to continuing to collect more objective measures of corrup-
tion, di¢ cult though that may be" (p. 962). Our preferred measure uses publicly
available data from the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).14 In particular,
11The name "civic lists" stems from the alleged origin of the candidates - civil society rather
than political parties. In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to them as independent
parties.
12We also used the average votersturnout during the period 1999-2001 (VOTE), which can
be thought as a visible form of participation. Regressions which include VOTINFO alone,
VOTE alone, both measures, or an average between VOTINFO and VOTE (as in Giordano
and Tommasino, 2013) are very similar and are available upon request.
13 In Italy, a province is an administrative division of intermediate level between a munic-
ipality and a region. A province is composed of many municipalities, and usually several
provinces form a region.
14As a robustness check, we use also the corruption index proposed by Golden and Picci
(2005), which is based on the di¤erence between the cumulative amount of resources devoted to
public works in each province and the physical quantities of infrastructures actually realized.
This "missing expenditure" index, which has been widely used in the literature (see, for
example, Pinotti, 2015 and Nannicini et al., 2013), is similar to the one computed by Olken
14
CORRUPT indicates the number of criminal charges against the State, public
governments and social institutions (per 100,000 inhabitants), and consists of
an aggregate indicator that includes crimes such as embezzlement, extortion,
conspiracy and other crimes against the faith and public order. CORRUPT
is available at provincial level and it is time-invariant, since we consider the
average number of crimes during the period 2004-2006. This measure, used by
Del Monte and Papagni (2007) and Abrate et al. (2015), does not reect actual
corruption crimes, but only the crimes reported to the police, and hence it likely
underestimates the true phenomenon.15
3.3 The cost frontier specication
We parameterize the stochastic cost frontier, in order to identify the relationship
between cost e¢ ciency and corruption. We use a translog function, that is a
second degree Taylor approximation of an arbitrary cost function, taking the
following form:
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In Equation (17) the residual is composed of a one-sided (uit) term, which follows
a truncated normal distribution with mean it, and a symmetric random noise
(vit). We further assume that vit and uit are homoskedastic and independent
of each other and uncorrelated with the output and input price vectors, yr and
ps.
The outputs yr are represented by the volume of MSW disposed (r = D)
and the volume of MSW recycled (r = R). On the side of productive factors,
prices refers to labor (s = L), capital (s = K) and fuel (s = F).
Cost and input prices are divided by the price of fuel (pF ) to ensure homo-
geneity of degree one in input prices while sr = rs and sm = ms impose
symmetry. Other non imposed properties, in particular concerning the concav-
ity of the cost function in input prices, are checked ex post.
We model the expected value of the pre-truncation normal distribution of
cost ine¢ ciency in accordance to the theoretical predictions derived in Section
2. In particular, we test three subsequent models:
(2009), who compared the amount of money spent for road-building projects in Indonesian
villages with an independent estimate of the actual cost of project realisazion provided by a
team of engineers. Results are very similar.
15However, Del Monte and Papagni (2007) defend the quality of this variable as an indicator
of corruption by showing that it is highly correlated to the traditional corruption perception
index (CPI) which, being based on survey data, is not subject to the above criticism.
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MODEL 1:
it = 0 + V OT lnV OTINFOit + CORR lnCORRUPTit (18)
MODEL 2:
it = 0 + lnV OTINFOit
 
V OT + V OT_CORPCORPit

(19)
+ lnCORRUPTit
 
CORR + CORR_LWLWPOLit

+CORPCORPit + LWLWPOLit
MODEL 3:
it = 0 + lnV OTINFOit
 
V OT + V OT_CORPCORPit

(20)
+ lnCORRUPTit
 
CORR + CORR_LWLWPOLit

+CORPCORPit+LWLWPOLit
+SSOUTHi+NNORTHi+LONGLONGITi+LATLATITi+GDPGDPit+TTIMEt
Following the indications from the theoretical model developed in Section 2,
Model 1 sets the municipality ine¢ ciency as a function of votersinformation
and corruption. Model 2 enriches the analysis using additional variables that
can impact on the way votersinformation or corruption are a¤ecting the e¢ -
cient provision of MSW services. More specically, it emphasizes the potential
interactions between votersinformation and the organizational form of service
supply, on the one hand, and corruption and political orientation on the other.
First, we control for the type of service organization, by adding a dummy identi-
fying municipalities that manage the service through limited responsibility com-
panies (CORP ). The type of ownership may directly impact on e¢ ciency, even
though empirical evidence in this sense is rather mixed (Bel et al., 2010). Fur-
thermore, if the potential impact of accountability varies across di¤erent types
of service organizations, we may observe an additional indirect e¤ect through
the parameter V OT_CORP . The underlying assumption is that the e¢ ciency
benets from higher voters information may be diluted or even disappear when
services are not provided through a limited liability company (the only one
subject to the private law administrative and accounting rules). For instance,
under in-house provision, a municipality could use cross-subsidization strategies
within the broad municipal budget, which can make it particularly challenging
for an observer to assess the actual cost, and hence the actual e¢ ciency, of the
service. In a similar vein, for associative consortia it is more di¢ cult to disen-
tangle the responsibilities of each municipality in case of poor performance in
the management of the service.
The second control concerns the type of political leadership in the local
councils, measured by the dummy variable LWPOL. In this case, as well, the
political variable is included by itself and in terms of interaction with the level
of corruption. The underlying idea is that local administrations leaning to the
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left might be more spending-oriented, but at the same time less a¤ected by dis-
torting corruption e¤ects (CORR_LW is expected to exhibit a negative sign).
To that regard, Hessami (2011) nds cross-country evidence that corruption in
the public sector is more likely to prevail when right-wing parties are in power.
She interprets her results by considering that: "members of right-wing parties
are more likely to originate from an entrepreneurial background and their party
platforms more strongly represent the interests of businessmen" (p. 2), so that
they often (more often than left-wing politicians) end up in a trustful, recipro-
cal relationship with representatives of the private sector, a link that can also
be used to foster illegal activities such as corruption. Moreover, Jimenez and
Garcia (2012) nd, in a large sample of Spanish municipalities, that, after a
politician is involved in a local corruption case, the voting share of left-wing
parties is reduced by 2-3 percentage points, while right-wing coalitions even in-
crease their share in subsequent elections. Therefore, left-wing parties appear
to have much more to lose if caught involved in corruption activities. Finally,
Model 3 adds several control variables in the mean ine¢ ciency ancillary equa-
tion, as a further robustness check on the key interest parameters. In particular,
the presence of a geographical e¤ect is captured both by means of two macro-
area dummies (NORTH and SOUTH) and by the exact latitude (LATIT) and
longitude (LONGIT) coordinates of each municipality. In addition, we account
for the time trend (TIME) and the GDP per capita of the province, a con-
trol meant to proxy for shocks that could a¤ect simultaneously corruption and
e¢ ciency.
3.4 Results
The one-step total cost frontier (17), combined either with the ine¢ ciency model
(18) or (19) or (20), is estimated using maximum likelihood technique. As a
normalization strategy, we have divided all continuous variables (cost, output,
input price, votersinformation and corruption measures) by their sample geo-
metric mean.16 This allows directly interpreting rst order parameters as cost
elasticities at the local approximation point. Table 2 displays the estimated pa-
rameters. All rst orders parameters of the cost frontier are strongly signicant
and have the expected positive sign. Output parameters D and R indicate
that a 1% increase in MSW disposed or MSW sent to recycling results, ceteris
paribus, in a 0.755 to 0.765% or 0.241 to 0.251% increase in costs respectively.
Scale economies at the sample mean can be computed as the inverse of the sum
of output elasticities. In this case, the adopted two-output cost frontier speci-
cation yields values around unity in all the models, thus suggesting that the
average municipality exhibits constant returns to scale. The estimates of labor
and capital price elasticities are given by parameters L and K . According to
Shephards lemma they equal the optimal labor and capital cost shares at the
local approximation point. The share of the factor (i.e., fuel) used as numeraire
16The geometric mean is less sensitive to outliers. This is an advantage, even though we
careful checked data consistency before estimation.
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in (17) can then be obtained residually. All the three models estimate a labor
cost share (between 38% and 45%) higher than the capital cost share (between
9% and 15%) and about the same as the fuel cost share (between 40% and
52%). This seems reasonable and in line with the typical cost structure in this
service. Second-order parameters give exibility to the functional form, allow-
ing to estimate pointwise output and input price elasticities. In particular, the
parameter DR is negative and signicant, suggesting cost complementarities in
the joint provision of disposal and recycling services. The specication of the
cost function (17) is simple. Since the main focus of the paper is to analyze
the impact of corruption and accountability on cost ine¢ ciency, we are not in-
cluding additional explanatory variables, such as environmental characteristics
(the population served, the area size of the municipality, the number of build-
ings), frequency of service, and the presence of nearby disposal facilities such as
incinerators or landlls.17
Turning to cost ine¢ ciency, Table 2 shows that the coe¢ cient associated to
votersinformation index (V OT ) in Model 1 is negative and highly statistically
signicant. Greater propensity to participation by citizens and therefore less
opacity in the relationship between citizens and decision-makers can substan-
tially reduce cost ine¢ ciency. This is in line with Besley and Burgess (2002),
as well as with a large anecdotal evidence pointing at the notion that a greater
pressure by public opinion is able to route managers and policy-makers towards
more e¢ cient decisions.
As expected, CORR is instead positive, suggesting that more widespread
corruption negatively a¤ect the e¢ ciency performance of MSW services. On
the whole, this leads support to our theoretical section.
Model 2 explores in greater details the e¤ects of votersinformation and cor-
ruption. In this case, the parameter V OT measures the impact of the degree of
votersinformation in the base case in which waste is collected directly by indi-
vidual municipalities or through inter-municipal consortia, while the parameter
of the interacted term (V OT_CORP ) should be interpreted as the incremental
e¤ect due to the presence of limited liability companies. By itself, the corpora-
tization of waste collection generally reduces cost ine¢ ciency (CORP = -0.112).
This result is in line with the empirical evidence about the positive e¤ects of
corporatization on the performance of local public services provision (Cambini
et al., 2011) The marginal impact of accountability in the case of service sup-
ply through distinct business organizations is very signicant (V OT_CORP =
-0.260) while V OT is not statistically signicant. This means that votersin-
formation reduces cost ine¢ ciency only if the service is managed through the
establishment of independent companies, while the presence of associations of
municipalities or of direct in-house management blur the potential benets of a
higher transparency.18
17Results of such estimations are available upon request. For more details concerning the
technological features of MSW services see Abrate et al. (2014), who focus on the impact of
di¤erent recycling shares on refusal collection costs and provide a complete analysis of scale,
scope, and density economies.
18An additional model estimation, not presented here, also tested for a di¤erential impact
18
Similarly, we analyze the di¤erential prevalence of corruption across di¤er-
ent political majorities. The parameter CORR_LW represents the incremental
cost ine¢ ciency due to corruption under left-wing political guidance. In Model
2 CORR still remains positive and highly statistically signicant, while the in-
teraction term CORR_LW is ine¢ ciency-reducing. The resulting e¤ect of cor-
ruption in municipalities led by left-wing local councils is equal to 0.215 (s.e. =
0.094) and is statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero at 5% level (p-value
= 0.023). This implies that in municipalities ruled by right-wing parties and by
independent parties ("civic lists") waste collection services su¤er more from cost
ine¢ ciency due to corruption. The impact of corruption is twice as large as that
recorded for municipalities ruled by left-wing parties. The behavior of left-wing
municipal councils is, however, more spending-oriented (LW = 0.133). In Model
3, all additional variables included in the ine¢ ciency model are signicant. The
geographical dummies conrm the well-known North-South division, suggesting
a higher (lower) refuse collection costs for Southern (Northern) municipalities,
while the time trend is negative and signicant at the 1% level across all the
models, indicating a cost reducing technological progress. Interesting enough,
the coe¢ cient for LONGIT is negative, suggesting that, after having checked
for the three macro regions (North, Center and South), eastern municipalities
are associated with lower costs.19 Perhaps surprisingly, the coe¢ cients for GDP
is positive. More importantly, the e¤ects of corruption and votersinformation
are conrmed.
The last rows in Table 2 show the statistics for  coe¢ cient, which is dened
as the ratio between the standard deviation of the ine¢ ciency term (u) and
the standard deviation of random noise. The values are statistically signicant
at 1% level, indicating that the ine¢ ciency term has a signicant contribution
on total variation of the composed error. Then, the likelihood ratio tests of the
unrestricted Model 3 (U) against the restricted (R) Models 1 and 2 indicate that
including a large set of explanatory variables of expected ine¢ ciency would be
preferable.20
Using equation (16), we compute the marginal e¤ects on estimated cost
e¢ ciency for our preferred specication (Model 3). Results are displayed in Table
3, which provides a measure of the marginal improvement in the e¢ ciency level
that can be achieved by reducing corruption or increasing votersinformation.
The theoretical maximum cost e¢ ciency (frontier level) is equal to 1: therefore,
the e¢ ciency level can be also interpreted as the percentage of e¢ ciency achieved
with respect to the maximum. Since the explanatory variables are in logarithm,
the magnitude of the values in Table 3 can be interpreted as follows. In the cases
of in-house and inter-municipal consortia and the results were conrmed: VOTINFO does
not have a signicant impact on ine¢ ciency both in the case of in-house and inter-municipal
partnership.
19This implies, for example, that municipalities localized in the North-eastern Veneto region
(or Lazio and Apulia, for Center and South, respectively) are more e¢ cient than municipalities
localized in Piedmont (Sardinia and Sicily, respectively).
20The test statistics -2 (LLFR-LLFU), where LLF is the log-likelihood function of the
estimated models, is distributed as a Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of restrictions imposed.
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where the services are provided by limited liability companies, increasing voters
information by 10% would move the e¢ ciency level towards the frontier by
approximately 0.5%. Furthermore, decreasing corruption by 10% would increase
the e¢ ciency level, on average, by 0.68%, with a more remarkable impact for not
left-governed municipalities (0.83%). While these gures describe the average
impact, both e¤ects tend to be more pronounced when the estimated e¢ ciency
decreases.
3.5 Impact of votersinformation and corruption on costs
In this section we provide evidence on the impact of voters information and
corruption changes on cost variation. Based on the cost frontier c(yit; pit;),
and on the marginal e¤ects on e¢ ciency computed (16), the e¤ect of changes
of z-factors (z) in relation to the actual observed cost can be measured as
follows:
4Cost
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
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Table 4 simulates the average cost change due to a reduction or expansion of vot-
ersinformation and corruption levels, respectively, up to the maximum/minimum
level. Accordingly, a reduction in votersinformation to the minimum level re-
sults in a cost increase of approximately 8.6% of the observed cost while expand-
ing the level of votersinformation to the maximum value (within the sample)
would allow cost savings in the order of 6%, corresponding to approximately 6
euros per inhabitant. If extended to the whole Italian population, this gure
would translate in a total cost savings of almost 400 million euros. A more wide-
spread corruption (to the maximum level) would increase costs of 3.9% in the
presence of local governments leaning to the left and up to 11.4% in the group of
not left-wing observations. By contrast, programs aimed at curbing corruption
would allow, in the not left-wing group, cost savings up to 10.9%, correspond-
ing to approximately 11 euros per inhabitant. These gures are as almost three
times those for the group of municipalities ruled by left-wing political parties,
and corroborate the previous evidence concerning a lower permeability of the
latter to the corruption plague.
Finally, Table 5 details cost simulations for a set of large municipalities (with
more than 300,000 inhabitants). With reference to the two mostly populated
Italian cities, Rome and Milan, a large reduction in the degree of corruption
is expected to result in a relative cost saving of 12-14%, equivalent to around
20-28 euros per inhabitant. Also the second largest Southern city, Palermo,
looks like it would be heavily a¤ected by a hypothetical improvement in the
degree of corruption. In the same vein, an improvement in the level of voters
information in the two most populous cities is shown to induce a relative cost
saving ranging between 2.5 and 3.1%, equivalent to a saving of 4-6 euros per
inhabitant. The major benet would concern, in this case, the Southern mu-
nicipalities (Palermo and Bari), generally plagued by less transparency in the
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decision-making process.
3.6 Robustness checks
In this section, we focus on the causality relation between ine¢ ciency and cor-
ruption, addressing the potential endogeneity problem arising from the model
specication. First, following Dal Bó and Rossi (2007), we argue that using
corruption data at the provincial level and municipal-level data from one par-
ticular industry limits the potential endogeneity problems. In fact, while it is
likely that existing corruption in a province has an impact on the cost e¢ ciency
of a subset of rms such as our waste management providers, it is less likely that
the ine¢ ciency of the latter will a¤ect the provinces overall corruption level.
However, our corruption proxy might still capture the e¤ect of some other
omitted factors (such as, for instance, the corruption crimes not reported to
the police). As a result, as a robustness analysis, we instrument our key vari-
ables of interest. Our instruments exploit the correlation between history and
institutional quality variables such as corruption. The idea is that some crit-
ical historical events (such as a foreign domination or the formation of civic
traditions) still matter for current institutional settings of a region (such as
corruption), but do not plausibly inuence current economic performance.
The rst set of instruments follows Putnam et al. (1993), who proposed a
9-scale measure of civicness of Italian provinces in the period between 1860 and
1920. In particular, the index has been computed using data on membership in
mutual aid societies and in cooperatives, strenght of the mass parties, turnout
in the few open elections before the advent of Fascism, longevity of local cultural
and recreational organizations.21
The second, alternative, instrument we use follows Di Liberto and Sideri
(2015). They analyze the link between institutional quality and the economic
performance of Italian provinces using, as instruments, the histories of the dif-
ferent foreign dominations that ruled Italian regions (in a time span of seven
hundred years before the unication of Italy which occurred in the late 19th cen-
tury). We use two instruments, FORDOMyear and FORDOMs. FORDOMyear
accounts for the number of years during which each Province has been ruled (the
maximum value is for the provinces controlled by the Papal state, who ruled
for 700 years). FORDOMs accounts for the number of di¤erent dominators
that governed a specic Province at di¤erent periods of time in the seven cen-
turies taken into consideration. In particular, it is constructed as a Krugmans
specialization index: FORDOMs =
P
i j bi  
 
b j; where i identies the nine
possible dominations (the Normans, the Swabians, the Anjou, the Aragonese,
the Bourbons, the Papal State, the Savoy, the Austrians and the Republic of
21According to Putnam et al. (1993): "In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
same Italian regions that sustained cooperatives and choral societies also provided the most
support for mutual aid societes and mass parties, and citizens in those same regions were the
most eager to make use of their newly granted electoral rights. Elsewhere, by contrast, apathy
and ancient vertical bonds of clientelism restrained civic involvement and inhibited voluntary,
horizontally organized manifestations of social solidarity" (p. 149).
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Venice), bi is the percentage of years a specic dominator ruled a province (i.e.
bi =total number of years/700), and
 
b is the average b for all provinces. A high
value of FORDOMs means that the province has been ruled by the same regime
for a long period of time, while a low value occurs if there have been di¤erent
dominations over the centuries.22
The identication strategy employs a two-step approach to instrument cor-
ruption taking Model 3 as the baseline and using alternatively, as rst stage
instruments, the Putnams scale of civicness for the early unitary period and
the type of historical dominations. In the second stage, the frontier model is
run by including the tted values of corruption (instead of the original ones)
among the determinants of ine¢ ciency.
The high value of the rst stage F-statistic suggests that both civicness and
historical dominance are good instruments for corruption.23
The estimates, shown in Table 6, conrm most of the results. In particular,
the impact of corruption on ine¢ ciency remains signicant in all models and
the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is even higher than in Model 3. This means
that, if a problem of endogeneity due to omitted variable should exist, it would
potentially go in the direction of underestimating the e¤ect of corruption. This
results seems consistent with the notion that the proposed measure of corrup-
tion (CORRUPT), based on reported corruption crimes only, might partially
underestimate the true phenomenon, and thus the cost benets emerging from
our simulations might be regarded as conservative.
The only di¤erence with respect to the evidence discussed in the previous
Section consists in the signicance of the interaction with left side politicians.
This is ensured only when we use civicness as our instrument (while it disappears
when we use foreign dominations).
4 Conclusions
Politically connected public services providers may be less e¢ cient than stan-
dard competitive rms. The principals (voters) may observe the agents (the
service provider managers) only very imperfectly. In addition, the interaction
between voters and managers is mediated by politicians, who act both as agents
of the voters, and as principals of the public service providers. In this context,
managers have incentives to exploit the limited information on their behavior
22Following Di Liberto and Sideri (2015), we considered also as instruments the full set of
dummies accounting for the di¤erent dominators (or the years matrix in which each dominator
has been associated with the number of years of ruling). Results are very similar.
23 In particular, as a rule of thumb, one could say that an instrument is not weak when the
F-statistic is larger than 10. Actually, Stock and Yogo (2005) develop more rigorous tables
dening the critical minimum value of F to avoid the problem of weak instruments, depending
on the number of instruments. In both Model 4 and 5, the value of F is much larger then such
critical values. Moreover, while the high number of instruments used in Model 4 (8 dummy
variables) might bring out a suspect of overidentication, this problem is ruled out in Model 5
where the number of instruments is exactly the same as the number of instrumented variables.
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by the voters. They may put in less e¤ort, and exploit corruption opportuni-
ties, which may be particularly appealing to them thanks to their relations with
politicians.
The aim of this paper is to analyze both theoretically and empirically how
voters information and a corrupt environment impact on e¢ ciency in the provi-
sion of a typical local public service, such as solid waste collection and disposal.
On the theory side, we integrate corruption into a standard career concern
model. We separately identify corruption and shirking as sources of ine¢ ciency.
We do not model corruption as an activity that directly damages the rm; our
choice reects the notion that managers respond to incentives to corruption,
which are determined by the environment in which they operate. We nd that
ine¢ ciency is larger for operators located in areas where information on their
performances is less precise. We also show that ine¢ ciency is larger in more
corrupt environments, in which managersincentives are distorted towards ac-
tivities that do not benet the company, while they are privately rewarding.
Our theoretical predictions are tested using a rich dataset on solid waste man-
agement services provided by Italian municipalities for the years 2004-2006. The
results of our cost frontier estimates show that both votersinformation, mea-
sured by newspapersreadership, and corruption, measured using o¢ cial data
about the criminal activity at provincial level, matter and exhibit a signicant
impact (negative for corruption, positive for votersinformation) on e¢ ciency
levels. In addition, we show that the e¤ect of voters information declines or
even disappears when municipalities provide the service in-house or by adhering
to intermunicipal consortia, which appear to be less e¢ cient ways of organizing
the activity, as compared to entrusting it to a limited liability company. Fi-
nally, we nd that, while municipalities ruled by left-wing parties exhibit higher
ine¢ ciency levels, they are also those in which the impact of corruption on
ine¢ ciency is lower.
Our results are robust to the introduction of further explanatory variables
of the mean value of the ine¢ ciency term, to the measurement of corruption
through the missing-expenditure index introduced by Golden and Picci (2005),
and to the use of instrumental variables estimation.
Overall, our ndings suggest that e¤ective anti-corruption measures, and/or
carefully designed incentives for citizens to acquire information, can have sub-
stantail e¤ects on the costs of collecting solid waste, especially for the Southern
regions of the country. Our simulations for six Italian major cities show that
costs can decrease in the range of 3-14%, if corruption declined to the minimum
value observed in the sample, while they can decrease in the range of 2-11%, if
accountability increased up to its maximum value.
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Simulation of the equilibrium values of ap and au as a function of  , using
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
TC Total cost (000 €) 5,436 23,965 46 48,065 
yD Waste disposed (t) 17,125 71,195 118.44 1,462,128 
yR Waste recycled (t) 3,770 13,044 8.86 210,211 
pL Price of labor (€ / Employee) 36,394 5,744 21,000 62,613 
pK Price of capital (depreciation rate) 0.087 0.013 0.049 0.124 
pF Price of diesel fuel (€ / liter) 1.023 0.122 0.780 1.370 
CORP Limited responsibility company (dummy) 0.819 0.386 0 1 
HOUSE In-house provision (dummy) 0.100 0.300 0 1 
INTMUN Inter-municipal partnership (dummy) 0.081 0.273 0 1 
LWPOL Left wing political orientation (dummy) 0.287 0.453 0 1 
RWPOL Right wing political orientation (dummy) 0.178 0.383 0 1 
CIVIC Civic or municipal lists (dummy) 0.534 0.499 0 1 
VOTINFO Newspaper readers (per 1,000 inhabitants) 74.095 38.519 17.94 175.43 
CORRUPT Crimes against public faith (per 100,000 inhab.) 5.492 1.819 1.703 15.113 
LATIT Latitude coordinate 42.524 2.661 35.503 46.610 
LONGIT Longitude coordinate 12.413 2.789 7.333 18.377 
GDP Per-capita added value 21,782 7,014 11,639 36,542 
Table 2. Cost frontier estimates 
Variables Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
lnyD βD 0.765*** 0.755*** 0.758*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
lnyR βR 0.246*** 0.251*** 0.241*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
lnpL βL 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.383*** 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.055) 
lnpK βK 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.093* 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.048) 
(lnyD)
2 βDD 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.174*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
(lnyR)
2 βRR 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.097*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
(lnpL)
2 βLL -0.043 -0.118 0.207 
(0.384) (0.381) (0.370) 
(lnpK)
2 βKK -1.232*** -1.203*** -0.459 
(0.414) (0.413) (0.411) 
(lnyD)(lnyR) βDR -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.120*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
(lnpL)(lnyD) βLD 0.071 0.079* 0.059 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
(lnpL)(lnyR) βLR 0.020 0.023 0.024 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
(lnpL)(lnpK) βLK -0.075 -0.031 -0.335 
(0.318) (0.319) (0.310) 
(lnpK)(lnyD) βKD 0.012 0.009 -0.067 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) 
(lnpK)(lnyR) βKR -0.046 -0.052 0.008 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Constant β0 -0.300*** -0.307*** -0.280*** 
(0.031) (0.039) (0.042) 
Inefficiency model 
lnVOTINFO δVOT -0.253*** -0.040 -0.043 
(0.072) (0.054) (0.049) 
CORP δCORP -0.112** -0.028 
(0.057) (0.030) 
lnVOTINFO × CORP δVOT_CORP -0.260*** -0.178*** 
(0.099) (0.045) 
lnCORRUPT δCORR 0.399*** 0.462*** 0.298*** 
(0.089) (0.101) (0.058) 
LWPOL δLW 0.133*** 0.084*** 
(0.040) (0.024) 
lnCORRUPT × LWPOL δCORRLW -0.247** -0.206*** 
(0.105) (0.070) 
SOUTH δS 0.342*** 
(0.059) 
NORTH δN -0.197*** 
(0.047) 
LONGIT δLONG -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
LATIT δLAT 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
GDP δGDP 0.104*** 
(0.033) 
TIME δT -0.063*** 
(0.014) 
Constant δ0 0.002 0.117 0.203*** 
(0.115) (0.092) (0.065) 
Std. Dev. One-sided error term U 0.214*** 0.192*** 0.075* 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.041) 
Std. Dev. Two-sided error term V 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.265*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Lambda  0.856*** 0.770*** 0.285*** 
(0.042) (0.038) (0.049) 
LLF -252.097 -237.508 -185.806 
LR test 132.580*** 103.400*** 
Number of observations 1587 1587 1587 
Statistically significant at 1% ***, 5% **, 10%*, standard errors in round brackets.
Table 3. Marginal effects on estimated cost efficiency (based on Model 3) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Voters’ information 0.050 0.014 0.017 0.075 
    if CORP = 1 
Corruption -0.068 0.032 -0.125 -0.012 
    if LWPOL = 1 -0.029 0.006 -0.039 -0.012 
    if LWPOL = 0 -0.083 0.024 -0.125 -0.029 
  
 
 
Table 4. Impact of voters’ information and corruption on costs (based on Model 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  If CORP = 1 If LWPOL = 1 If LWPOL = 0 
Average population  45,662 54,152 35,828 
 Cost change 
(% variation)  
 -0.039 -0.109 
 corruption 
(to minimum value) 
Cost change 
(million €)  
 -0.3 -0.6 
 Cost change  
(€ per inhabit.) 
 -4.45 -10.99 
 Cost change 
(% variation)  
 0.039 0.114 
 corruption 
(to maximum value) 
Cost change 
(million €)  
 0.3 0.5 
 Cost change  
(€ per inhabit.) 
 4.49 11.28 
 Cost change 
(% variation)  
0.086   
 voters’ information 
(to minimum value) 
Cost change 
(million €)  
0.6   
 Cost change  
(€ per inhabit.) 
9.57   
 Cost change 
(% variation)  
-0.058   
 voters’ information 
(to maximum value) 
Cost change 
(million €)  
-0.3   
 Cost change  
(€ per inhabit.) 
-6.05   
Table 5. Impact of voters’ information and corruption on costs for some large municipalities 
(based on Model 3) 
ROME MILAN TURIN PALERMO FLORENCE BARI 
Average population 2,711,491 1,297,244 910,437 662,046 366,074 321,747 
Geographical region Center North North South Center South 
Cost change 
(% variation) 
-0.125 -0.141 -0.053 -0.138 -0.091 -0.026 
 corruption 
(to minimum value) 
Cost change 
(million €) 
-53.4 -36.3 -7.5 -14.2 -6.2 -1.2 
Cost change 
(€ per inhabit.) 
-19.69 -27.98 -8.24 -21.43 -16.99 -3.69 
Cost change 
(% variation) 
0.066 0.107 0.064 0.128 0.067 0.075 
 corruption 
(to maximum value) 
Cost change 
(million €) 
28.4 27.5 9.0 13.2 4.6 3.4 
Cost change 
(€ per inhabit.) 
10.47 21.22 9.86 19.88 12.58 10.57 
Cost change 
(% variation) 
0.142 0.154 0.104 0.086 0.141 0.073 
 voters’ information 
(to minimum value) 
Cost change 
(million €) 
61.9 39.6 15.2 8.9 9.4 3.3 
Cost change 
(€ per inhabit.) 
22.85 30.53 16.71 13.43 25.69 10.22 
Cost change 
(% variation) 
-0.025 -0.031 -0.033 -0.083 -0.028 -0.113 
 voters’ information 
(to maximum value) 
Cost change 
(million €) 
-11.2 -8.0 -4.8 -8.6 -1.9 -5.2 
Cost change 
(€ per inhabit.) 
-4.13 -6.19 -5.23 -12.96 -5.19 -16.06 
Table 6. Instrumental variables estimates of the inefficiency model 
Variables Parameters Model 4 Model 5 
Instruments: 
Putnam civicness 
Instruments:  
Dominations (1100-1800) 
Number of instruments: 8 Number of instruments: 2 
lnVOTINFO δACC 0.014 -0.042 
(0.043) (0.048) 
CORP δCORP -0.014 0.001 
(0.026) (0.026) 
lnVOTINFO × CORP δACC_CORP -0.181*** -0.095** 
(0.039) (0.041) 
lnCORRUPT δCORR 0.522*** 0.430*** 
(0.055) (0.132) 
LWPOL δLW 0.075*** 0.076*** 
(0.018) (0.020) 
lnCORRUPT × LWPOL δCORRLW -0.367*** -0.084 
(0.090) (0.146) 
SOUTH δS 0.269*** 0.242*** 
(0.039) (0.043) 
NORTH δN -0.090*** -0.072 
(0.035) (0.047) 
LONGIT δLONG -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
LATIT δLAT 0.002*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP δGDP 0.040** 0.027 
(0.020) (0.031) 
TIME δT -0.057*** -0.060*** 
(0.012) (0.014) 
Constant δ0 0.188*** 0.220* 
(0.047) (0.123) 
First stage F-statistic 
[instruments only] (a) 
F (8, 1568) 
71.680 
F (2, 1575) 
48.300 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations    1587    1587 
Statistically significant at 1% ***, 5% **, 10%*, standard errors in round brackets.
(a) 
The F-statistic tests the validity of instruments: the null hypothesis is that, respectively, Putnam civicness dummies and 
domination indexes are jointly not significantly different from 0 in the first stage regression. F-statistic must be at least larger than 
10 to avoid the problem of weak instruments.  
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
UNIVERSITY OF TORINO 
Corso Unione Sovietica 218 bis - 10134 Torino (ITALY) 
Web page: http://esomas.econ.unito.it/ 
